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Strung Out On Analogies Of Everything
Are the Mathematical Metaphors in Popular Physics Books Intuitive?
Abstractions from research for an Open University MSc Science degree
Patrick HUBBUCK
 Here are six representative sets of scientists (no one more than once) and 
books which met the criteria for my science-as-language teaching research. 
For each set, one central source is identified (The Books = B1–B7).
Set 1
Robert Oerter
The Theory Of Almost Everything
B1: Stephen Hawking
A Brief History Of Time
John Gribbin
In Search of Superstrings
Set 5
John Barrow
New Theories Of Everything
B5: Paul Davies
The Goldilocks Enigma
Leonard Susskind
The Cosmic Landscape
Set 2
João Magueijo
Faster Than The Speed Of Light
B2: Michio Kaku
Beyond Einstein
Paul Steinhardt & Neil Turok
Endless Universe
Set 6
Lee Smolin
The Trouble With Physics
B6: Peter Woit
Not Even Wrong
David Lindley
The End of Physics
Set 3
Steven Weinberg
Dreams Of A Final Theory
B3: Lisa Randall
Warped Passages
Brian Greene
The Elegant Universe
Set 7
Robert Laughlin
A Different Universe
B7: David Deutsch
The Fabric Of Reality
Seth Lloyd
Programming The Universe
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 Over 50 popular science paperbacks were surveyed before The Books 
(above) were selected. Here are the selection criteria:
	 •	 Written	(or	co-written)	by	practising	academic	scientists	no	earlier	than	
Hawking’s (1988).
	 •	 Explaining	 fundamental	 physics	 concepts	 of	 relativity	 and	 quantum	
theory, and attempts at their unification, without formal mathematics 
(but often with pictures).
	 •	 Referring	 to	 string	 and/or	 superstring	 theory	 as	 a	 potential	 theory	 of	
everything (ToE).
	 While	the	general	research	was	equally	informed	by	all	members	of	Sets	
1–7, samples of popular science language for teaching were drawn exclusively 
from The Books (B1–B7, cf Hubbuck in Mulberry 59 forthcoming).
 NB: Set 4 is empty by (counter-intuitive?) design.
Preface
‘To discover the right style is to discover what you are really trying to do.’
 Bernard Williams
 The general research began with my distance learning of science 
communication, via the UK’s Open University (OU). Most instructive to me, 
as	a	teacher	of	English	for	Academic	Purposes	(EAP)	in	Japan,	were	questions	
about the role of language in both the construction and communication of 
‘scientific’ knowledge. I was particularly struck by Medawar’s argument that 
the scientific paper is ‘a fraud’1.
 Why, when science progresses as often through the right metaphor2 as 
through	 replicable	 experiment	 or	 successful	 equation,	 do	 peer-reviewed	
journals demand a style devoid of rhetorical figures and interpersonal 
pronouns? It wasn’t always so. The sociolinguistic segregation of science 
from the humanities was a 20th Century development, an elitist mystification 
which led to a deficit in the public understanding of science. By the 1990s, in 
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democracies worldwide, a more authentic discourse was being demanded—
one in which all citizens might aspire to some assessable level of scientific 
literacy. Ultimately, this meant communicating ‘science-as-language’ in 
21st Century environments, where the political climate was planetary, not 
national. My EAP experience had found a new calling.
 Since Stephen Hawking wrote A Brief History of Time in 1988, a surge of 
popular science books has appeared globally in English. Do they address the 
pedagogical demand for science as-language? Their style seems increasingly 
authentic to communication among scientists worldwide, since the Internet 
took control of the means of publication away from their journals. But can 
the metaphors which The Books use to avoid mathematics (because each 
equation	halves	sales!)	be	‘true’	to	the	mathematical	‘realism’	of	fundamental	
physics?3 Not if those metaphors make the cognitive deficit between genius 
and idiot seem irreparable, by romanticising the difficulty of maths (as if 
Einstein	didn’t	have	to	learn	from	quite	simple	mistakes!).
 To constructivists, scientific knowledge-transmission should not be directed 
and fixed (genius→idiot), but reciprocal and fluid (scientist-citizen↔citizen-
scientist).4 The most creative scientists—both professional and popular—are 
flexible, multidisciplinary roleplayers. Experts in one narrow specialisation, 
they	cheerfully	relinquish	authority	 to	become	novices in others—often by 
reading other experts’ popularisations (producer↔consumer). In all their 
democratic interactions, we should recognise patterns of lifelong learning for 
technological citizenship. Experimental groupwork in ICT-enhanced science-
as-language classes should follow.
 The Open University MSc Writing Guide (SUP 79674 2) says writing 
in Science Studies can be fun, a motivating ideal I try to maintain for my 
EAP students. So I’ll try to keep my style here edutaining, copying the 
genre	 I’ve	 been	 studying.	 Just	 as	 The	 Books	 avoid	 offputting	 equations,	
these abstractions avoid citations nested in hedges5. Register varies with 
personal pronouns. In instructional mode, I might transmit some information 
(writer→reader), then assess my success by testing you (teacher→learner). 
Or, let’s deconstruct the conduit metaphor we just used as a scaffold, and 
channel our intuitions into more creative analogies (thinker↔thinker).
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 It seems ironic that peer-reviewed journals are losing their power to 
alienate	 scientists	 from	 the	humanities—to	a	machine!	 Is	 this	 just	because	
citizens are converging with scientists in their everyday use of computers 
(e.g. to avoid doing maths)? Or is a more intelligent transition taking place 
at some carbon↔silicon	 interface?	 Certainly,	 ICT	 metaphors/analogies	
now	proliferate	across	all	 the	old	science/humanities	domains,	and	 in	 their	
popularisations.6 Their interdisciplinary and multimodal translations may 
emerge to confuse you in this report …
	 	 …	and	that’s	just	in	English,	not	the	only	natural	language	of	science!
1. Introduction
‘The gods in the beginning are not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual 
confusion.’
 Karl Marx
1.1 A theory of everything real?
 Let’s start with an intuitive overview of how science gets done in The 
Books. I’ll map B1–B7 to six stages in a theoretical physicist’s career through 
his	or	her	ToE	paradigm.	(B4	must	give	us	pause	to	dream	in!)	If	this	makes	
Stephen seem permanently at the genesis stage, Lisa always establishing 
herself, only David ever making it through to revelation; remember: a 
productive	analogy	suppresses	as	much	contradiction	as	it	generates	insight!	
The Books’ authors progress and regress in their careers, wear different 
hats7 for different jobs, multitask at different stages simultaneously. Plus, 
each Book plots many career-trajectories, from Copernicus’s to Witten’s. 
Enjoy the reductionist overview, but please don’t forget how complicated 
everything	really	is!
Stage 1: Introduction to …
 Dreaming of the cutting edge of his field, our young physicist must first 
get to grips with its prior knowledge traditions. It’s hard going. It helps if 
he	has	the	eternal	enthusiasm	(if	not	the	infinite	patience!)	of	a	schoolboy.	
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Respect for the founding fathers (e.g. Galileo, Newton and Einstein) is 
nurtured	through	first	hand	experience	of	their	methods	and	equations;	and	
comes naturally anyway—they were all iconoclasts in their day. Originally 
counterintuitive developments our hero must make time for will include 
(briefly): Greek geometry, Renaissance astronomy, the schism between 
science and religion; Newton’s gravity, Maxwell’s electromagnetism; 
Einstein’s	 relativity,	 singularity;	 Heisenberg’s	 uncertainty,	 wave/particle	
duality; the atom bomb8; the big bang, black holes; success of the standard 
model,	 failure	of	quantum	gravity;	 supersymmetry,	 string	 theory	 (super	or	
not) and the ultimate promise of M-theory (which he won’t understand).
Stage 2: Courtship of …
 Eager to make his mark, our young radical will intuitively fixate on one or 
two self-evident holes (multi-loop amplitudes?) in an established theory (e.g. 
of string fields). Even if his exciting new solutions violate relativity, he’ll 
identify with the young Einstein, blaming Heisenberg for the atomic bomb. 
He’ll expect the old Einsteins of the establishment to accord his new ideas 
equal	courtesy.	In	so	doing,	he	may	confuse	self-consciousness	with	the	real 
measure of a scientist (like Wigner9). Only if his results prove unreasonably 
effective	can	he	expect	to	make	a	name	for	himself	(below	Einstein’s!).	Then	
he’ll be potentially useful, and the ToE community will recognise that with a 
probationary job offer.
Stage 3: Establishment in …
 Her position uncertain, our new member of the science establishment 
will network hard within	 her	 chosen	 paradigm.	 Allying	 with	 equally	
insecure peers, she’ll collaborate to associate her name with theirs, and 
gather momentum through the powerful authorities they cite. Anxious to be 
institutionalised, once would-be radicals often overcompensate: our heroine 
must prove herself in everything	her	colleagues	can	do!	Fortunately,	she’s	still	
energetic enough to put many of them to shame. But she’ll have to tunnel that 
restlessness into ever-narrower dimensions, if she’s to expand prior thought 
in her school without undermining its seniors. Success in science is a social 
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equation,	 in	 which	 being	 popular	 counts	 as	much	 as	 being	 productive.	 If	
she makes it, work will never be that mental again. For physical challenges 
though, she’ll have to hike deserts and climb mountains.10
Stage 5: Reaching out …
 Ensconced in a salaried practice on which his family depends, what 
does our once youthful hero do for theoretical excitement? By this stage, 
administrative duties will have forced him to network outside his chosen 
paradigm	 (e.g.	 in	 economics).	 So	 he’ll’ve	 acquired	 skills	 in	 the	 courteous	
translation of its central ideas, both across to other sciences, and out to 
nonscientists. Reciprocally, ideas from far-flung domains will have mapped 
themselves onto his own. He’ll feel driven to incorporate them, or else 
abandon his pretention to know everything. Our sympathetic humanist’s 21st 
Century ToE must now extend at the very least to: artificial intelligence, 
biogenesis,	consciousness,	dark	matter/energy,	evolution,	final	cause,	genes,	
intelligent	design,	life,	mind,	paradoxes,	qualia,	teleology,	virtual	reality	and	
(most	vitally!)	water.11
Stage 6: Reaction against …
 His securities beseiged by a new generation of school-shifting Einsteins, 
our anti-hero worries his way through a mid-career crisis. To simultaneously 
1) keep faith with the profession he’s known by, and 5) heed the intuitive 
call	 of	 truth	 from	 outside,	 is	 irrational	 (and	 splits	 an	 infinitive!).	 Science	
is	 suddenly	 a	 question	 of	moral intelligence. Should he defend his vested 
interest with all his authority; or embrace change and be shifted back to career 
stage one? It isn’t an easy decision.12 Analogies with old heroes (e.g. young 
Einstein) no longer lend him their favourable aura. At stake is everything he 
has worked hard to achieve, including the support of family and friends. Oh, 
but	just	to	feel	righteous	again	for	the	first	time	in	ages!
Stage 7: Escape from …
 Whither by accident or intelligent design, some scientists find themselves 
doing	 cutting-edge	 research	 (e.g.	 quantum	computation	 and	 cryptography)	
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in a well-established institution (e.g. Oxford University). If also gifted 
with that alchemical blend of humility and arrogance which makes great 
communicators, they’ll emerge unifying metaphors across generations and 
knowledge-domains13, in a language free of the principal stultifications of 
reductionist science. They may appear, in one career, to experience everything 
that workers worldwide dream of, both professionally (salaried recognition, 
job satisfaction) and personally (a happy family, their love and respect). 
Appearances can be as deceptive, however, as the harmony of Kepler’s 
spheres; today’s visionary profession may become yesterday’s evolutionary 
dead-end job. In which case, go back to Stage 1.
1.2 A theory of everything psychological?
 My course through the Lakoff School of conceptual metaphor followed 
that school’s chronological development by George: from his little 1980 
book with Mark Johnson (Metaphors We Live By), through his pre-millennial 
bipolar tensions with Gentner et al. (a dubious analogy?), to his newfound 
pre-eminence in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. As 
Gibbs, the latter’s editor, notes:
  research on metaphor is now as multidisciplinary, and interdisciplinary, as 
perhaps any topic being studied in contemporary academia. (2008: 4)
 Which makes metaphor some kind of ToE (and vice versa). Lakoff’s 
School should therefore have something to say about The Books. So let’s 
target six sources from my metaphor studies, heading pedagogically back 
towards The Books. With our blank slates so ‘overwritten’,14 we’ll then have 
to play andragogue in the Review (2.1–2.7).
Course 1: A brief philosophy of language
 I first heard of Lakoff in EAP, where ‘hedging’ is attributed to him. Later, 
I discovered George was a major combatant in ‘the linguistics wars’, over 
whether Noam’s colourless green syntax was actually meaningful. Pinker 
disputed irregulars with Lakoff, who became an ally of Deutscher in the 
latter’s evolutionary leap beyond the LAD.15 So while I wasn’t surprised 
that the metaphor Lakoff first lived by was ARGUMENT IS WAR, I was at his 
─  ─86
愛知県立大学外国語学部紀要第42号（言語・文学編）
old-school philosophy: No corpus data, just handwritten intuitions in print 
(with	no	index!).	Before	entering	Lakoff’s	School,	I	sought	a	more	corporeal	
approach to The Books, off-campus. Using Open University search engines, 
I found David Banks (2.1).
Course 2: Beyond literature
 In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff & Johnson started a cognitive science 
argument:
  Your claims are indefensible.
  He attacked every weak point in my argument.
  His criticisms were right on target. (: 4)
 They persuaded us that, undermining metaphor’s use as a literary pretense16, 
were inferentially structured mappings between conceptual domains: from a 
source we know to a target we want to. In 2003, after their book had shifted 
the meaning of ‘metaphor’ (from linguistic device to multimodal concept), 
they admitted they’d reversed the polarity of their want of experience (: 265 
WAR IS ARGUMENT?). In the restructured multidisciplinary Lakoff School, 
‘the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing 
in terms of another.’ (: 5) Can it improve string-theory teaching? Let’s ask 
Noah	Podolefsky!	(2.2)
Course 3: Warped paradigms
 At the turn of the millennium, the cogsci establishment was making a 
schism out of a subtle distinction. While the Lakoff School had represented 
itself as ‘The Contemporary Theory’ at Ortony’s multidisciplinary conference 
on Metaphor and Thought, it was still sectioned off from the real theory-
changing science of 1993(: viii). Then, Gentner’s ‘Shift from metaphor to 
analogy in Western science’ led by 2001 to The Analogical Mind; wherein 
‘Metaphor is like Analogy’—but with a structured career directionality which 
makes analogy the special case for hard scientists:
  analogy is used in explanatory-predictive contexts, while metaphor can be 
used more broadly, in either explanatory-predictive or expressive-affective 
contexts. (: 236)
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 Interminological bipolar warguments (METAPHOR IS ANALOGY↔ANALOGY 
IS METAPHOR) dilated a Lakoff School pupil named Gedanken17. “Uncle 
Albert sent me here to learn some proper	science!”	she	complained.	And	then	
along came Brown … (2.3)
Stage 5: The Gödel, Escher, Bach enigma
  a fictitious, unimaginably large book each of whose pages, on a one-by-one 
basis, contained exhaustive information on one specific neuron in Einstein’s 
brain. (Twentieth-anniversary Preface, P. –10)
 That Carrollian book was imagined, by Douglas Hofstadter in his 
metaphorical fugue on minds and machines: Gödel, Escher, Bach. GEB was 
contemporaneous with Metaphors We Live By. Compare the two. Hofstadter 
drafted GEB on ‘one of the world’s earliest and best word-processing 
programs’, TV-Edit (: P. –12), for ‘one of the world’s first computer 
typesetting systems’ (: P. –13). It contained and continues to generate
  a slew of profound and beautiful ideas in mathematics, physics, computer 
science, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and so on. (: P. –9)
 GEB rejects the bio-chauvinist view that any meaning in these ideas
	 	 springs	only	from	the	organic	chemistry,	or	perhaps	the	quantum	mechanics,	
of processes that take place in carbon-based biological brains […] the key is 
not the stuff out of which brains are made, but the patterns that can come to 
exist inside (: P. 3–4).
 Pre-GEB, Hoftsadter got his PhD in solid-state physics. Post-GEB, he 
worked in AI, founding the Fluid Analogies Research Groug (FARG), in 
sympathy18 with Dierdre Gentner. He also translated Pushkin’s Eugene 
Onegin. (P. –21) Where does the romance and maths come from in Lakoff’s 
School? (2.5)
Course 6: Not necessarily right
 Where Mathematics Comes From, Lakoff’s turn-of-the-millennium 
collaboration with Rafael Núñez (hereafter L & N, 2.5), took me right 
back to pre-exam nightmares19 at school. L & N’s explanations make good 
pedagogical	sense,	answering	the	questions	my	school	teachers	had	failed	to	
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(e.g.	on	the	ε–δ	approach	to	the	limit	of	my	understanding!).	But	when	L	&	
N denied me the romance of Mathgod20, I felt wronged. Mathgod was my 
original motive for studying The Books.
Course 7: The real fabric of ideas
 In The Math Gene, professional research mathematician Keith Devlin 
argues ‘mathematical ability is essentially just a new use of a mental faculty 
that gave us language—namely, off-line symbolic thinking.’ (2000: 285) 
Watching the ‘involuntary simulation behaviour’ of a sleeping cat, Jerome A. 
Feldman of the Lakoff School suggests an evolutionary adaptation to account 
for it:
  Suppose that the mammalian involuntary simulation mechanisms were 
augmented by brain circuits that could explicitly control what was being 
imagined. (From Molecule to Metaphor 2008: 328–9)
 Feldman’s Neural Theory of Language (NTL) promises to unify the 
grammar and syntax of language and thought, further incorporating 
multimodalities	 like	 intonation	 and	 gesture	 (:	302–3).	 Its	 mind/body	
mappings are ICT-analogues which depend on computer mathematics:
  in the proof of the four-colour conjecture the use of the computer was 
absolutely essential—the proof hinged directly on it.21
 Regarding human mathematics, will L & N’s minds be changed? (2.7)
2. Review
 ‘In the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too) those who learned 
to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed.’
 Charles Darwin
2.1 Grammatical metaphor
 David Banks’ 2008 study of The Development of Scientific Writing is a model 
of sound methodology and precise reporting. No grandiose philosophical 
claims22, just an honest investigation of a restricted but significant historical 
corpus. Banks tracks changes in English science writing: from Chaucer’s 
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Treatise on the Astrolabe, through Bacon, via Newton, across three centuries 
of Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (1700–1980). These he 
divides into physical and biological sectors. A change he finds in the former 
is significant here:
  In the physical sciences, a major development occurs at the turn of the 
twentieth century, when the focus moves from the experiment as such to 
mathematical modelling. (: 198)
 Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) providing his necessary theoretical 
framework, Banks sets out to show that ‘language changes as a function 
of the context of scientific research in which it is produced.’ (: 4) He 
distinguishes his own quantitative methods (based on research writing) from 
the qualitative	remarks	(often	based	on	‘high	quality	popularisation’	(:	18))	of	
SFL’s founding father, Halliday: one of the few authors cited across both EAP 
and science education.23 Unfortunately, as Wellington & Osborne noted:
  Space here does not allow the kind of detailed insights provided by the work 
of the linguist Martin Halliday (Halliday and Martin 1993), to which the 
interested reader is referred. (2001: 81)
 An SFL24 concept the Lakoff school should make space for is grammatical 
metaphor, one of the phenomena Banks witnesses changing as twentieth 
century science progresses (: 123). With examples from Newton’s Opticks, 
he shows how the ‘usual or congruent’ verbalisation of processes (e.g. ‘was 
refracted’, ‘be reflected’) gets nominalised (‘the greatest Refraction’, ‘a total 
Reflexion’) (: 13); with both grammatical and semantic effects:
	 	 since	nouns	can	be	modified	and	qualified,	 the	nominal	groups	could	have	
additional Modifiers and Qualifiers […]
  that the process now has a nominal form means that it takes on some of the 
quality	of	an	entity	(:	14)
 The historical nominalisation of processes like ‘experiment’, Banks 
believes (: 130–2), ‘is particularly appropriate to scientific writing’ (: 14). 
Indeed, he shows nominalisation increasing ‘in the creation of technical 
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vocabulary’ across his period of study. (: 135) Again, Banks’ sources and 
findings are relevant to problems Wellington & Osborne raised for science 
teachers, and may help the latter find solutions in EAP now: ‘constructing 
and deconstructing nominalisations and noun groups’, for instance.25
 EAP recognises how difficult it is for non-native students to unpack 
grammatical metaphors. Since this language lost most of its inflections, 
change from one part of speech to another is intuitive. Consider how 
‘green’ has switched from adjective to noun (‘a green field’, ‘the village 
green’) to verb (‘let’s green the city’): which of these uses still feels like 
a living metaphor? In scientific English, native speakers face comparable 
confusions. Consider ‘experiment’: is its literal use now nominal or verbal? 
Based on corpus data, learner dictionaries put ‘experiment=noun’ before 
the	less	frequent	(but	etymologically	prior)	‘experiment=verb’.26 But in the 
specialised physical sector of Banks’ scientific corpus, even that nominalised 
usage	‘wanes	as	mathematical	techniques	begin	to	be	used	in	the	twentieth	
century.’ (: 133)
 More confusing technicalities emerge when we study science in more 
than one language. Banks shows that, in Motte’s 1729 edition of Newton’s 
Principia, ‘the nominalised processes of the English translation are directly 
derived	 from	 the	 original	 Latin	 text.’	 (:	63)	 Can	 questions	 about	 Latin’s	
influence on scientific English (or vice versa) be empirically resolved 
from the surviving evidence (none of it aural)? Circumstantially, Newton 
nominalised	less	frequently	when	decribing	mathematics	than	in	his	accounts	
of experiments, seemingly anticipating the decline of ‘the experiment’ in 
twentieth	 century	mathematical	 physics.	Now,	would	 quantum	 theories	 be	
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better	described	in	a	verb-rich,	noun-poor	Algonquian	language?27 Here’s a 
non-reifying conclusion from Banks:
  I am not so much concluding my subject, as abandoning it at this point, and 
floating it off to a reading public. (: 198)
2.2 Teaching physics
 Noah Podolefsky’s pragmatic survey of the physics education literature on 
analogy, with personalised examples from University of Colorado websites 
(FERMIONIC CONDENSATES ARE DANCERS (: 2)), nicely sidesteps the old 
philosophical stance that ‘scientific language should exist free from metaphor 
and analogy.’ (: 6) Instead, the Lakoff school’s notion ‘that analogies 
form a part of our conceptual system’ (: 6) is given scientific pedigree, 
through Maxwell’s exemplary use of a ‘fluid’ analogy (: 2). Further study 
of Maxwell’s muscular metaphors28 would support Podolefsky’s findings 
that ‘analogies may be both communicative and generative’ (: 3); and that 
‘effective	teaching	strategies’	require	analogies	groundable	in	students’	prior	
knowledge and culture: ‘the analogy cannot be too abstract.’ (: 16)
 Podolefsky uses Rutherford’s planetary model of the atom as an example 
in three ways:
 1. to illustrate ‘a subtle distinction’ (: 2) between Lakoff’s ‘metaphor’ and 
Gentner’s ‘analogy’;
 2. to demonstrate that Lakoff and Gentner’s terms are, for effective 
teaching purposes, ‘interchangeabl[e]’ (: 2);
 3. to show how the generative analogy of a paradigm can remain 
communicative after it shifts.29
 Re. 3., Rutherford’s planetary model generated better explanations of 
experimental results than Thomson’s competing ‘plum pudding’; since the 
ascendance of wave-mechanical models, Rutherford’s is nonetheless still 
used ‘to communicate an introductory atomic model to physics students’. 
(: 3). Here’s how Podolefsky represents it as a Lakoffian metaphor, but with 
Gentner’s term ‘base’ for the source domain.
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The Planetary Model of the Atom
Solar System (Base Domain) Atom (Target Domain)
Sun Nucleus
Planets Electrons
Sun attracts planets Nucleus attracts electrons
Sun is more massive than planets Nucleus is more massive than electrons
 ‘With a formalism more familiar to mathematicians’ (: 5), Podolefsky 
presents Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory30 as a more abstract and 
empirical model of ‘analogy’ (the term Podolefsky prefers to ‘metaphor’ by 
82 to17 uses). Here’s Podolefsky’s figure of Gentner’s model of Rutherford’s 
analogy:
Figure	1.	Structure-map	for	the	Rutherford	analogy:	“The	atom	is	like	the	solar	system.”
 Among Gentner’s domain comparisons, analogy is differentiated from 
literal similarity thus: single-input attributes (HOT(sun)) may be compared 
across two domains (HOTTER THAN), but are less likely to be analogically 
mapped than dual-input relations, eg:
(ATTRACTS(sun,planet)→(nucleus,electron)).
 This formal notation aspires to Gentner’s third category of domain 
comparison, abstraction, wherein ‘the base domain is an abstract relational 
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structure’ (: 6). As an expert physicist, Podolefsky knows novices must learn 
how to ‘think in terms of abstractions’ (: 15) , eg:
(→ACQUIRE(metarepresentational competence) (: 8)).
 However, prior research seems to indicate that, in Gentner’s terminology, 
the analogy leads to conceptual change more readily than the abstraction. 
(: 15)
Figure 2. Structure-map for electric circuit and water system,  
adapted from Gentner’s original paper.
 How analogy selection effects conceptual31 change was tested by Gentners, 
with regard to understanding of electricity from two base domains: i) water 
and ii) moving object (race track). See Podolefsky’s adaptation of Gentner’s 
structure-map (above), but remember: neither analogy has ‘all the correct 
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properties of electric circuits’ (: 9). Others (bicycle chain?) may also fit. 
The Gentners predicted that i) the water analogy would generate better 
understanding of batteries, while ii) imagining crowds moving would yield 
better concepts of resistors. When high school students generated their 
analogies spontaneously, both predictions were confirmed; but when these 
analogies were pre-taught, the water system failed to produce better answers 
to	questions	about	batteries.
 Podolefsky makes the educational implications clear: if ‘inferences people 
make on a certain topic vary according to the analogies they use’ (: 8), then:
  the success of an analogy-based teaching method depends on student 
knowledge of the base domain (i.e. prior knowledge), and student acceptance 
of the analogy. (: 12)
 This in turn relies on teachers and textbooks intercepting common student 
misconceptions in intermediary steps, between grounded sense and targeted 
abstraction.
  Lakoff’s idea of layering may prove useful—students may develop the skill of 
abstraction by building upon lower level analogical thinking skills.’ (: 15)
 A good case study here would’ve been Arons’ in(ter)vention of ‘internal 
energy’ to forestall common ‘infelicities’ in teaching the Work-Kinetic 
Energy Theorem:
  introducing what amounts to the First Law of Thermodynamics right at 
the start. This can be done without excessive abstraction and without the 
more sophisticated mathematical apparatus usually associated with formal 
thermodynamics.32
 Do the intuitive directions of both Gentners’ formally structured analogies 
AND Lakoff’s experientially mechanistic metaphors look familiar in the 
following form?
BASE/SOURCE→LAYER1…→LAYERN→TARGET
	 Yes!	 It’s	 that	 scourge	 of	 constructivist	 science	 communicators,	 the	
cognitive-deficit/transmission	model	(or	conduit	metaphor33), in yet another 
authoritative	disguise!	Is	it	any	wonder	Podolefsky	finds	‘few	studies	have	
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examined spontaneous generation by students.’ (: 14) Indeed, when 31 of 
their 46 high school subjects spontaneously conceived of electricity in terms 
other	 than	 water	 OR	 moving	 crowd,	 the	 Gentners	 excluded	 them!	 (:	9)	
Outside the control boxes of research, however, Podolefsky thinks teachers 
should encourage nonlinear thinking:
  Simultaneous domain comparisons may lead students to extract abstract 
structure and develop conceptual knowledge.’ (: 15)
 We want our students to understand batteries AND resistors, don’t we?
2.3 Counter-intuitive embodied concepts?
 In Making Truth: Metaphor in Science, practising scientist and science-
administrator Theodore L. Brown seeks ‘a new perspective on the ways in 
which science gets done.’ (2003: 1) It should be inclusive of ‘public policy 
questions	with	 important	 ethical	 and	 economic	 implications’;	 and	 address	
the fact that ‘the text materials used in science education are defective.’ (: 2) 
Brown begins with Polyani’s post-Popperian popularisation34 of sleepwalking 
scientists, who only vaguely intuit their vision of a dynamic hidden reality:
  The shifting character of that vision is determined for the individual scientist 
by the twin characteristics of intuition and imagination. (: 7–8)
 These implicit epistemological processes being largely unconscious, 
artificial intelligence has so far failed to emulate them. (: 9) Brown’s new 
perspective	 on	 metaphor	 in	 science	 is	 consequently	 more	 20th	 Century	
Lakoff than 21st Century Gentner.
 In The Books, ‘relativity’ collocates significantly with ‘counterintuitive’. 
In the Lakoff School, this seems paradoxical. How, from physically grounded 
inferences, could Einstein have constructed ‘counterintuitive theoretical 
ideas that defied the evidence of the senses’? (: 10) Brown’s answer: young 
Einstein’s imaginings, while ‘counterintuitive in terms of a Newtonian 
conception of the world’, needn’t be so to Einsteineans:
  the physical premises of the gedankenexperiment were extensions of 
Einstein’s everyday physical experiences.[…] His genius lay in thinking 
about those experiences in novel ways. (: 11)
 Teach Special Relativity to children without prior layerings of Newtonian 
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prejudice, and you’ll discover spacetime has always been a common sense 
preposition:
  For in language—any language—no two domains are more intimately linked 
than space and time.35
 Quantum theory also
  seems to spell trouble for the idea that science proceeds using models based 
on embodied experience with the macroscopic world. (Brown: 88)
 A Rutherford, schooled in the physical forcefields of Newton and Maxwell, 
simply could not reverse-engineer the abstract mathematical models of a 
Bohr:
	 	 how	does	an	electron	decide	what	frequency	it	is	going	to	vibrate	at	when	it	
passes from one stationary state to another? (: 88)
 It doesn’t, answers Brown:
  the transition occurs essentially instantaneously; there is no clear physical 
model (: 88).
 Even if there was, any instrumental measures to test it would (like their 
mathematical interpretations) be ‘representational metaphors’36, of a world 
no human sense can never scale.
  For example, the colour in scanning tunneling microscope pictures is added 
for visual effect; it is not inherent in the data. (: 98)
 These constructivist paradoxes aside, Brown remains a committed 
scientific realist:
  The images we obtain are indeed based on a stable, mind-independent reality. 
(97)
 So what is the priveleged status of science’s relationship with it? Brown 
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says	our	instrumental	readings	of	(and	mathematical	writings	about)	quantum	
scale events
  are constructs that at their best represent reliable models of reality, with 
sufficient verisimilitude to serve as productive metaphors. (: 99)
 Their productivity is usually technological, and often exaptive—unless 
television	was	the	final	cause	of	Thomson’s	model-testing	cathode	ray	tube!	
Like authentic anecdotes in The Books, Brown’s case studies show scientific 
‘seers’ often wonder what to make of what they’ve seen; more technically-
minded ‘craftspeople’ have to show them.37 Uncertain seers don’t produce the 
best pedagogical metaphors either.
  But it is clear that to put the uncertainty principle into terms that have meaning 
for most people, a simple physical metaphor is needed. (: 93, italics mine)
Figure this! Heisenberg’s gamma-ray microscope gedanken  
reformulated (in part)17
 Einstein was a seer who made good common sense. Heisenberg’s 
‘gedanken’, on the other hand, doesn’t help Lakoff School teachers embody 
counterintuitive	quanta.	(:	92)	Is	it	because:
  Heisenberg’s thought experiments in the original form cannot be regarded 
as illustration of the uncertainty principle implied by the mathematical 
formalism	of	quantum	mechanics?38
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 If so, we need a better non-mathematical illustration, for all the reasons 
Brown has just shown us: uncertainty is fundamental to our best scientific 
reality; we can ‘see’ it only through representational metaphors; these need to 
be clear enough to teach to schoolkids; the existing educational texts aren’t.
	 Yet,	 if	 wave/particle	 duality	 describes	 the	 world	 humans	 and	 language	
evolved in, we must always have had novel39 ways—beneath careful 
layerings of troubled denial—to re-spell it.
  Imagine yourself at Einstein’s autopsy, watching them trying to gauge the 
full measure of the man, by cutting up his brain. Dead-certain of his body’s 
position, aren’t you simultaneously mystified about the momentous influence 
of Einstein’s mind across fields of knowledge? For even as you observe with 
gravity the singular end of their originator, Einstein’s thoughts are having 
a forceful effect at a distance. Through his language, countless persons are 
virtually interacting with Einstein the man; his ideas continuing to alter reality 
as if—improbably—still	Einstein	lives!	As	for	you—one	particular observer 
whose path just collided with a famous decay—isn’t your individuality now 
and forever caught up in waves of history? You’ll be moved physically and 
mentally in ways you’ll never completely relate, as the media outside the 
inquest	accelerate the story—eventually,	you’ll	move	others	too!40
2.5 Where mathematics comes from
 However intuitive, science-as-language must do justice to an experimental 
reality	 which	 we	 know	 to	 be	 mind-independent,	 as	 it	 ‘“kicks	 back”	 in	 a	
complex,	autonomous	way’.	(B7:	223)	Equally,	science-as-language	teachers	
must respect ‘the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’41 at accounting 
for that reality (B6: 194). Otherwise, they won’t be teaching the laws of 
physics, or communicating how physicists believe they know them.
  Speak to physicists, and most of them will talk as if the laws are real things—
not physical objects, of course, but abstract relationships between physical 
entities […] relationships that really exist, ‘out there’ in the world, and not just 
in our heads. (B5: 12)
 There’s much more evidence in The Books of what L & N call this 
‘romance’ of mathematics. (2.7)
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 If we’re to speak a language in which string theoretical ideas can make 
productive sense, we’ll need to embody their mathematical meanings in it; 
i.e.
  dispel the paradoxes and clear away the shrouds of mystery to reveal in full 
clarity the magnificence of those ideas. (L & N: 5–6)
	 Stuck	 in	 some	 Ordinary	 Level	 equations	 at	 school,	 I	 once	 complained	
to my genius friend, ‘I don’t know how to do this.’ He looked at my paper 
and	said,	‘Yes	you	do,	idiot;	you’ve	got	the	right	answer!’	I	had,	but	I	didn’t	
understand why. How on Earth did he?
  The meaning of mathematical symbols is not in the symbols alone and how 
they can be manipulated by rule […] Ultimately, mathematical meaning is 
like everyday meaning. It is part of embodied cognition. This has important 
consequences	for	the	teaching	of	mathematics.	(L	&	N:	49)
 L & N propose a courteous translation from the sensory-motor schemata in 
which maths is grounded (e.g. Source-Path-Goal: 37; Container: 32, pictured 
above), up into such multi-layered abstractions as eπi + 1 = 0 (: 381–451); 
and back down again. If we want said translation (and its multimodal 
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illustrations) legitimised for science teaching, we must provide scientific 
evidence for the claims it’s making. L & N take this bottom-up approach. 
They provide convincing support for the evolutionary and developmental 
origins of arithmetic in the subitising abilities demonstrated by animals 
and infant humans (who can all count up to 3, but get confused around 
4!).	 (:	19–23)	From	plausible	 (if	 less	 established)	 evidence	 from	cognitive	
science, L & N then argue ‘the most fundamental mathematical ideas are 
inherently metaphorical in nature’ (: xvi). Contemporary mathematicans42 are 
unlikely to be put out by any of this; physicists may await firmer proof of its 
neurological basis. In the meantime, will L & N help mathematical novices 
like me?
  One of the principal results in cognitive science is that abstract concepts are 
typically understood , via metaphor, in terms of more concrete concepts. 
(: 39)
 From this result came the linear SOURCE→TARGET mappings of the Lakoff 
School, such as the following, ‘from the domain of physical objects to the 
domain of numbers’ (: 55):
 ‘Object Collection’ (above) is the first of L & N’s four grounding 
metaphors (the 4Gs), which allow humans to extend numerical concepts 
beyond subitising ‘while preserving the basic properties of innate arithmetic’ 
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(: 77). The others are: ‘Object Construction, the Measuring Stick, and Motion 
Along a Line.’ (: 75) These seem like sensible beginnings for primary school 
shapes and sums. Nonetheless, an elementary problem is left over:
  In our everyday experience, the result of taking a collection of seven objects 
from a collection of seven objects is an absence of any objects at all—not a 
collection of objects. (: 64)
 In a manoeuvre reminiscent of unreasonable effectiveness in The Books, L 
& N fix this with ‘a metaphor that creates something out of nothing’ (: 64):
 But isn’t this an inference backwards from ABSTRACT→CONCRETE? It seems 
even at low-levels, entity-creating metaphors can be disorientational43!
 The conduit metaphor (SOURCE→TARGET), on which L & N’s conceptual 
metaphors were historically based, has oversimplified their presumed 
neurological substrate. Individual neurone outputs are unidirectional all-
or-none signals; but each one is the sum of many excitatory and inhibitory 
inputs. (Natural language nodes reflect this, cf reference-ambiguity in 
my previous ‘their’). Moreover, L & N acknowledge that communication 
between brain regions involves a conflation of simultaneously-activated, 
multiply-networked neuronal links—
  links that often result in conceptual metaphor, in which one domain is 
conceptualised in terms of the other. (: 42)
 So to sustain the mathematical inferences generated by their dual-domain 
simplifications, L & N must inhibit otherwise self-evident (neurotic44?) 
complexes.	 How	 else	 could	 the	 following	 metaphor	 masquerade	 as	
CONCRETE→ABSTRACT? (: 142)
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 In L & N’s terms, the above was a linking metaphor, different from a 
grounding in that:
  both the source and target domains of the mapping are within mathematics 
itself. (: 142)
 The result is a metaphorical blend of two distinct cognitive structures, 
whose entailments may include the creation of new entities in both domains 
(: 48). Try ‘stretching the 4Gs’ (: 89) up through layers of such blends to the 
next example, then ask yourself: which domain is more concrete, Source or 
Target? (: 263)
	 Answer:	it	depends	on	the	order	of	your	prior	courses	in	maths!	Gentner’s	
abstract analogies are more fitting here than L & N’s embodied metaphors. 
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(2.2) The 4Gs may well be part of ‘the cognitive unconscious’, arising from 
our	 ‘commonplace	 experience’	 as	 children,	 and	 subsequently	 ‘extremely	
common in everyday thought and language’. (: 41) But you don’t need to rise 
to a very high consciousness of mathematics to get disoriented with regard to 
earthbound spacetime. Indeed, counterintuitive directions are now emerging 
at almost zero-level complexity in computer mathematics (e.g. Wolfram’s 
Rule 30 cellular automaton (2002: 27)). To fit the ICT-ecology of this new 
kind of Mathgod, Lakoff School principles of human mathematics may need 
revising.45
	 	 The	 results	of	our	 inquiry	 should	not	 change	mathematics	 in	 any	way,	but	
they may radically change the way mathematics is understood and what 
mathematical results are taken to mean. (: 8)
2.6 The basic metaphor of infinity
	 ∞
2.7 Back to zero!
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 Lakoff’s paper in the 2008 Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and 
Thought devotes significant space to Feldman’s NTL, ‘a must-read for 
metaphor theorists’. (: 17) Under headings like ‘Embodiment and Simulation 
Semantics’ (: 18) and ‘Neural Choreography’ (: 20):
  The NTL perspective provides a very different way of thinking about such 
complex metaphors (: 25)
as were analysed in THE OLD THEORY. (: 24–5) NTL notation (: 37, scanned & 
pasted above) evinces how AI models and fluid analogies are now changing 
Lakoff’s minding46 of natural language:
  This is where we are in the neural theory of metaphor as of November 2006. 
We have a reasonable early approximation to the kinds of computations that 
neuronal groups must perform to characterise [metaphors, blends, etc]. A 
parsing program to use these kinds of constructions is being constructed.
 This computer-applied shift in Lakoff’s old-School methodology must 
have implications for some of its human-theoretical principles.
	 The	physicists	who	may	have	been	awaiting	a	firmer	basis	for	metaphor/
analogy in mathematics (2.5) might now be tempted into interdisciplinary 
meetings of minds. If human intuition (pattern recognition?) is anything 
to go by, the neural substrate of NTL is where the hardware and software 
of	 a	 quantum-computational	 fabric	 of	 reality	 might	 actually	 merge	 (B7:	
194). I said ‘merge’, but the nominalisation (2.1) ‘emergence’ (: 32, B7: 
362–4) would be a more productive word-level metaphor to map (graph-
theoretically? (3.3)) across the cutting edges of both the Lakoff School and 
The Books. An even more precise topological47 term for transdisciplinary 
corpus analysis (3.1) is ‘symmetry’. Be courteous:
  Symmetry is a sacred word to most physicists. One might conjecture that 
other communities value symmetry highly as well. […] Spontaneous 
symmetry	breaking	is	not	only	ubiquitous	in	physics,	but	is	a	prevalent	feature	
of everyday life. Lisa Randall (B3: 191 & 205)
  Neurones […] involved in physical bodily functioning tend to fire more. For 
this reason, the metaphorical maps learned are asymmetric and tend to have 
physical source domains (though some have social source domains). George 
Lakoff (: 28)
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 In Gentner-style notation (2.2):
TOEPHYSICAL{emergence,	symmetry}↔TOEPSYCHOLOGICAL{emergence,	symmetry}→TOEBIG!
  (a)              (b)
 Developmental considerations in NTL might also generate transdisciplinary 
insights. If ‘children pick up some general information about the sound 
patterns of their language even before birth,’48 then the new Lakoff School 
may have to reverse the polarity of its old SPACE→TIME metaphor (as it did 
ARGUMENT↔WAR). Aural ante-natal experience of the mother’s biorhythms 
and intonations in time happens prior to visual-tactile, post-natal exploration 
of space. The multi-modality of NTL modelling (: 19) means the sensory-
motor dimensions of our SPACETIME experiences might be unfolded from 
their compactifications in wombs and brains, and mapped across the creative 
braneworlds	(B3:	50–4)	of	post-quantum	physics.
 Núñez’s paper in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought 
remains preoccupied with just such human dimensions of mathematical 
language.	He	gets	stuck	where	I	did	too,	in	the	nominalised	ε–δ	approach	of	
mathematicians to the infinite continuities they intuit from limited iterative 
computation (: 343–349). Has he momentarily forgotten that the Basic 
Metaphor of Infinity (2.6) he co-developed for the Lakoff school should not 
be taken too literally?
  We can observe that there is no motion whatsoever involved. No entity is 
actually approaching anything or moving beyond anywhere. So, why then 
did these respected Russian mathematicians use dynamic language to express 
static properties of static entities? (: 344)
 I asked a Russian mathematician49 to resolve Núñez’s linguistic confusion, 
and he pointed out that Núñez is already well on the way to doing so himself. 
Núñez’s studies of maths lecturers’ gestures show how a verbal grammatical 
metaphor (2.1) can coexist with and be complemented by a ‘forgotten 
dimension of thought and language’ (: 352) —one of the ones NTL is, even 
as we speak, encoding for the Lakoff School.
─  ─106
愛知県立大学外国語学部紀要第42号（言語・文学編）
 Núñez’s 2008 paper re-emphasises his 2000 ‘romance’ (with Lakoff) of 
human mathematics. I would appreciate L & N’s pedagogy more if they 
devoted less obsessive spacetime to an ancient cognitive dissonance which, 
after Gödel50, cannot ever completely be fixed. Of course, it’s part of being 
human to want to put our fingers on mercurial ideals; but their philosophical 
reification is just a grammatical trick (2.1). They will move us again, as 
discourteous translations of the foundation stones we thought we’d overkilled 
for dead certain. Nothing	we	can	do	will	forever	stop	the	universe	thinking!	
Consider these premises of the romance of mathematics, every one of which 
appeared false to L & N at the millennium:
	 •	 Mathematics	 is	 part	 of	 the	 physical	 universe	 and	 provides	 rational	
structure to it.
	 •	 To	 learn	 mathematics	 is	 to	 learn	 the	 language	 of	 nature,	 a	 mode	 of	
thought that would have to be shared by any highly intelligent beings 
anywhere in the universe.
	 •	 Machines	can,	in	principle,	think.	(:	xv–xvi)
 Now compare the Lakoff School’s new NTL syllabus.
	 •	 Mathematics	 is	 physically	 embodied	 in	 the	 neurochemistry	 of	 the	
brain.
	 •	 Terrestrial animals share that neurochemistry and thus the early stages 
of an evolutionary programme which developed into human arithmetic. 
(Watch	this	space	for	more	from	SETI	and	AI!)
	 •	 Computer	 simulations	of	human	cognitive	processes	 are	beginning	 to	
generate meaningful results.
 Surely, Lakoff School teachers can’t continue refuting a ‘romance’ on 
which their most progressive lessons are self-evidently founded. To do 
so would mean returning to that Philosophy in the Flesh which Lakoff 
and Johnson once took great pains to leave behind (when according to 
Hofstadter, Mathgod already had). Is there a theory of EVERYTHING big 
enough to reconcile our reactionary human discomfort with the emergence of 
artificially-intelligent designs? It’s getting harder even to ask the appropriate 
question!
 We don’t know what planetary common sense will emerge round the 
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current ICT-metaphorical twist. A theory of anything might prove exaptive, 
and in a school where playing with everything is positively encouraged, 
anyone might find stumble on something scientifically useful. So having got 
well and truly strung out on analogies of everything, we’ll need to come 
gently back to an earth whose educational climate is fast-changing. How a 
language teacher made passable sense of such science-seeming abstractions 
will be the subject of my forthcoming paper in Mulberry 59 (2010), to include 
examples for teaching from The Books.
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